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Maintaining the Status Quo:
The Business-as-Usual Scenario 
The business-as-usual scenario (BAU), as described in Chapter 3, projects thefuture of the food and water sectors if current planning and trends in poli-cies, management, and investments were to continue to 2025. BAU is used
throughout the book as a benchmark against which the results of other scenarios
are compared.1
THE WATER STORY
“Water demand,” as discussed in Chapter 2, can be defined and measured in terms
of withdrawals and actual consumptive uses (See Box 2.1). While water withdraw-
al is the most commonly estimated figure, consumptive use best captures actual
water use, and most of our analysis utilizes this concept. Total global water with-
drawal in 2025 is projected to increase 22 percent above 1995 levels under BAU to
4,772 cubic kilometers—consistent with other recent projections to 2025 includ-
ing the Alcamo et al. (1998) medium scenario of 4,580 cubic kilometers, the
Seckler et al. (1998) business-as-usual scenario of 4,569 cubic kilometers, and the
Shiklomanov (1999) forecast of 4,966 cubic kilometers (excluding reservoir evap-
oration) (Table 4.1). The increase is much higher in developing countries, at 27 per-
cent over the 30-year projection period. 
The “criticality ratio,” or the ratio of water withdrawal to total renewable
water, is an indicator of water scarcity stress at the basin level (Alcamo, Henrichs,
and Rösch 2000; Raskin 1997). The higher the criticality ratio, the more intensive
the use of river basin water, and the lower the water quality for downstream users.
Hence at high criticality ratios, water usage by downstream users can be impaired,
and during low flow periods, the chance of absolute water shortages increases.
There is no objective basis for selecting a threshold between low and high water
stress, but the literature indicates that criticality ratios equal to or greater than 0.4
are considered “high water stress,” and 0.8 “very high water stress” (Alcamo,
Henrichs, and Rösch 2000). 
Under BAU, the criticality ratio increases globally from 0.08 in 1995 to 0.10
in 2025 (Table 4.1) Although the criticality ratio is relatively low globally and for
large aggregated regions because of the abundance of water in some of the compo-
nent countries and basins that make up these aggregates, it is far higher for dry
regions. In China, the criticality ratio increases from 0.26 in 1995 to 0.33 in 2025
(a 27 percent increase), and in India, the criticality ratio increases from 0.30 to 0.36
(a 20 percent increase). Water-scarce basins in northern China and northern and
northwestern India have criticality ratios several times higher than these values (see
also Boxes 4.1 and 4.2). In West Asia and North Africa (WANA), the ratio increas-
es by 32 percent, from 0.69 to 0.90. While water stress is not particularly excessive
at the global level under BAU, many regions and people face high and significant-
ly worsening water stress over the projection period.
Table 4.1Total water withdrawal by volume and as a percentage of renewable
water
Total withdrawal
Total water as a percentage of
withdrawal (km3) renewable water (%)
1995 BAU projections 1995 BAU projections
Region/Country baseline 2010 2025 baseline 2010 2025
Asia 2,165 2,414 2,649 17 19 20
China 679 759 846 26 29 33
India 674 750 815 30 33 36
Southeast Asia 203 240 287 4 4 5
South Asia excluding India 353 391 421 18 20 22
Latin America (LA) 298 354 410 2 2 3
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 128 166 214 2 3 4
West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 236 266 297 69 81 90
Developed countries 1,144 1,223 1,265 9 9 10
Developing countries 2,762 3,134 3,507 8 9 10
World 3,906 4,356 4,772 8 9 10
Sources: 1995 baseline data for total withdrawals are author estimates based on Shiklomanov (1999)
and Gleick (1993) for individual countries and regions; HPDGJ (1989), Qian (1991), NIHWR (1998), and
CMWR (199098) for river basins in China; USGS (1998) for river basins in the United States; ESCAP
(1995) and IMWR (19982000) for river basins in India. 1995 baseline data for renewable water are from
Alcamo et al. (1998). 2025 data are IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; km3, cubic kilometers.
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Box 4.1Water scarce basins 
The analysis in this book primarily focuses on water and food futures at
the global scale and for major countries and regions, but it is also essen-
tial to assess how changes in trends, policies, and investments will affect
important water scarce river basins, where the impacts of changes may
be particularly high. Therefore, selected results for individual river
basins will be highlighted throughout the analysis, including the Yellow
(Huanghe) and Haihe River basins in northern China, the parts of the
Ganges and Indus River basins that lie within India. In addition, we
highlight alternative futures for Egypt, which is virtually coterminous
with the Nile River basin.  
The Yellow River is the second largest river in China, traversing nine
provinces on its 5,464 kilometer course through the northern heartland
of China. The Yellow River basin is of utmost importance for China in
terms of food production, natural resources, and socioeconomic devel-
opment: it covers 7 percent of China's land area and supports 136 mil-
lion people, or 11 percent of China's population. The total physical
crop area in the basin is 12.9 million hectares, of which 31 percent is
irrigated, but while it contains 13 percent of the total cultivated area in
China, it holds only 3 percent of the country's water resources
(CMWR 2002). Increased water scarcity in this basin is shown by inter-
ruption of flow in the lower Yellow River, declining groundwater levels,
disappearing lakes, and silting up of river beds (Dialogue on Water and
Climate 2002).
The Haihe River basin covers eight provinces and cities, including
China's capital city of Beijing and China's fourth largest city, Tianjin,
and has a population of 90 million. The basin extends over 3.3 percent
of China's total area, supports about 10 percent of China's population,
and holds 15 percent of China's industrial production and 10 percent
of the country's total agricultural output. Total physical crop area
amounts to 10.8 million hectares, 7.1 million hectares of which are irri-
gated (CMWR 2002). However, the Haihe basin has had a water
deficit for over 25 years, potentially leading to significant water quality
and quantity problems in this basin (Working Group on Environment
in U.S.-China Relations 1998). 
The Indus basin begins in Tibet and flows through India and Pakistan.
In India, about 60 million people reside in the basin area, which covers
the northern and northwestern states. The drainage area of 321,289
square kilometers of the Indus River basin encompasses nearly 10 per-
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(continued)
cent of the total geographical area of India. Cropland in the basin is
about 9.6 million hectares, 5 percent of the total cropland of the coun-
try, of which about 30 percent is irrigated (IMWR 2002). The fight for
water has been ongoing in the Indus, with water tables dropping
because of groundwater overpumping and basins running dry the for
portions of the year (Postel 2002). Water scarcity is an international
issue in the Indus; after the Independence of India and Pakistan, they
nearly went to war over this basin, a water treaty was established in
1960 that has proven resilient (Postel and Wolf 2001).  
The Ganges, the subcontinent's largest and most important river, rises
in Nepal and flows 1,400 miles through three densely populated Indian
states—Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal—before entering
Bangladesh and flowing into the Bay of Bengal (Hinrichsen, Robey,
and Upadhyay 1998). The Ganges River basin within India encompass-
es nearly 26 percent of the total geographical area of the country, and is
inhabited by 323 million people.  Physical cropland in the Indian part
of the basin is estimated to be 58 million hectares or 30 percent of the
total cropland of the country of which 20 percent is irrigated (IMWR
2002). Even though the Ganges does not seem water-scarce based on
total annual flows, it often experiences severe water stress from January
to April, and floods during other months (Biswas, Uitto, and
Nakayama 1998). 
The Nile River, the longest river in the world, flows from its major
source Lake Victoria in east central Africa, north through Uganda and
into Sudan where it meets the Blue Nile at Khartoum, which rises in
the Ethiopian highlands. From the confluence of the White and Blue
Nile, the river continues to flow northwards into Egypt and on to the
Mediterranean Sea (Nile Basin Initiative 2002). Egypt gets 97 percent
of its water from this river. However, as the countries in the upper Nile
basin continue to use more water given rising population and increasing
economic growth, Egypt's water share could decline (McNeeley 1999).
In 1995, the cultivated area in Egypt was 3.3 million hectares, or 3.2
percent of the total area and almost all cropland is irrigated. As men-
tioned above, the Nile River is by far the dominant water source of
water for Egypt and 90 percent of the cropland is in the Nile Valley and
delta area (FAO 1995). Thus the results presented for Egypt are closely
indicative of change in the Nile River basin within Egypt.
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Box 4.1Continued
Non-Irrigation Water Demand-Consumptive Use
Non-irrigation consumptive use varies by sector and at the basin, country, and
regional levels (Table 4.2). At a global level, all non-irrigation uses increase 225 cubic
kilometers over the period, an increase of 62 percent by 2025. All non-irrigation
uses are projected to increase significantly, with a large share of the increase occur-
ring in developing countries.
Box 4.2Water scarce basins under the busi-
ness-as-usual scenario: Growing scarcity
Income and population growth drive rapid increases in water consump-
tion in the domestic, industrial, and livestock sectors. Total non-irriga-
tion water consumption increases by 75 percent in the Yellow River
basin, 83 percent in the Haihe River basin, 88 percent in Egypt, and by
over 100 percent in the Indus and the Ganges compared with 1995 lev-
els. With limited water supply growth, this increase in non-irrigation
demand is in large part at the expense of water supply for irrigation. 
Water stress at the basin level, measured by the criticality ratio (ratio of
withdrawals to total renewable water), also increases significantly from
the already high levels in these basins under BAU. Even in 1995, the
criticality ratios for these basin are high a) based on world and develop-
ing country averages, b) relative to the thresholds for all the selected
basins compared with global and developing country averages, and c)
relative to the indicative threshold levels of 0.40 for high water stress
and 0.80 for very high water stress. And under BAU, these high stress
levels intensify, with Egypt increasing from 0.99 to 1.08, the Yellow
River basin from 0.89 to 1.11, the Haihe from 1.40 to 1.49, the Indus
from 0.72 to 0.90, and the Ganges from 0.50 to 0.57. The level of
water stress increases greatly across all basins in 2025, however. This
critical level of water stress signals increasingly serious water scarcity
problems in the future with probable poor water quality from high
water reuse rates.
Although irrigated area increases by 23 percent in the Yellow River
basin, 15 percent in the Haihe, 15 percent in Egypt, 28 percent in the
Indus, and 29 percent in the Ganges, irrigation water consumption
declines or barely increases.  Compared with 1995, irrigation water
consumption in 2025 declines by 19 percent in the Haihe and 6 per-
cent in the Ganges; and increases by 7 percent in Egypt, 5 percent in
the Yellow, and 12 percent in the Indus. Irrigation water supply reliabil-
ity (IWSR) declines between 1995 and 2025 in each of the basins and
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO      65
(continued)
Domestic water demand makes up 8 percent of total potential demand in 1995,
and is projected to increase to 11.5 percent by 2025 under BAU. Domestic demand
rises rapidly with a projected global increase of 71 percent, and a doubling of
demand in developing countries. Faster growth in developing countries results from
their higher population growth and a relatively rapid increase of per capita water
use from the existing low levels caused by income growth (Table 4.3). About 97 per-
cent of population growth occurs in developing countries, and per capita domestic
water use in developing countries is projected to increase by 8.3 cubic meters per
year. In contrast, population in developed countries increases only 4.6 percent
between 1995 and 2025, and per capita domestic water use increases by 6.4 cubic
meters per year over the initial 48 cubic meter level. Per capita domestic water use
declines under BAU in developed countries with the highest per capita water
demand—a result of conservation and technological improvements. Hence, total
domestic water demand in developed countries grows much more slowly than in
developing countries at just 10 cubic kilometers by 2025.       
Domestic water demand is differentiated as connected and unconnected house-
holds in both rural and urban areas.2 We assessed the percentage of population con-
nected and unconnected in rural and urban areas for various countries from 1995
Egypt, with particularly large drops in the Haihe (22 percent) and the
Ganges (19 percent). 
Under BAU, crop yields increase through agricultural research and
growth of fertilizer use and other inputs, raising total cereal production
in each of the water scarce basins between 1995 and 2025. Cereal pro-
duction is projected to increase by 48 percent in the Haihe, 45 percent
in the Yellow, 54 percent in the Indus, and 50 percent in the Ganges
River basins.  But increasing water scarcity slows cereal production
growth significantly. With the decline in IWSR, relative irrigated yields
(compared to full water adequacy) decline dramatically. The relative
irrigated cereal yield declines between 1995 and 2025 from 0.91 to
0.71 in the Yellow River basin, from 0.80 to 0.70 in the Haihe, from
0.88 to 0.71 in the Indus, from 0.83 to 0.67 in the Ganges, and from
0.66 to 0.59 in Egypt. Irrigated cereal yields in these basins thus range
from 11 percent lower (Egypt) to 22 percent lower (Yellow) in 2025
than they would have been if irrigation water scarcity had been main-
tained at 1995 levels. 
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Box 4.2Continued
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to 2025 using data on the percentage of population connected (WHO and
UNICEF 2000) the projected total urban and rural population in each country
(FAO 2000), and on our assessment of recent trends in development of urban water
systems. 
Table 4.4 shows the per capita water demand for connected and unconnected
rural and urban areas in selected countries and regions. Per capita demand is high-
er in urban than in rural areas, and connected demand is higher than unconnect-
ed demand.2 Worldwide, the 1995 per capita demand in unconnected rural
households is 55 percent of the connected demand, increasing to 60 percent by
2025; the per capita demand in unconnected urban households is 57 percent of the
connected demand and decreases to 52 percent by 2025 as a result of large increas-
es in urban population—especially in developing countries. 
The growth in global industrial water demand is also rapid, with demand
increasing by 50 percent for the world as a whole. (Table 4.2). The majority of this
increase also occurs in developing countries, where demand almost doubles. The
1995 estimate for industrial water consumption in the developed world is much
greater than that of the developing world; however, by 2025 developing world indus-
trial water demand is projected to increase to 121 cubic kilometers, 7 cubic kilo-
meters greater than the level in the developed world. The intensity of industrial water
use (water demand per $1,000 of GDP) decreases significantly worldwide, especially
Table 4.3Per capita domestic water demand
Per capita consumption (m3/person/year)
Baseline estimates BAU projection
Region/Country 1995 2010 2025
Asia 24.8 32.9 36.9
China 24.5 35.8 41.2
India 22.6 28.1 30.7
Southeast Asia 29.9 37.2 45.6
South Asia excluding India 23.7 27.4 29.6
Latin America (LA) 24.8 32.5 36.9
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 18.3 21.2 21.9
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 21.2 23.0 23.4
Developed countries 47.8 51.8 54.4
Developing countries 25.6 31.4 33.9
World 30.3 35.0 37.2
Sources: 1995 baseline data for total domestic water consumption are author estimates based on
Shiklomanov (1999) and Gleick (1993) for individual countries and regions; HPDGJ (1989), Qian (1991),
NIHWR (1998), and CMWR (199098) for river basins in China; USGS (1998) for river basins in the
United States; ESCAP (1995) and IMWR (19982000) for river basins in India. Connected population are
estimates based on WHO and UNICEF (2000) and FAO (2000). 2010 and 2025 data are IMPACT-WATER
projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; m3/person/year, cubic meters per person per year.
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in developing countries (where initial intensity levels are very high) because of
improved water-saving technology and demand policy in this sector (Table 4.5). The
increase of total industrial production, however, still leads to an increase in total
industrial water demand. Globally, industrial water demand is 7.4 percent of total
potential demand in 1995, and is projected to increase to 9.4 percent of the total
in 2025.
Direct water consumption by livestock is very small, but given the rapid increase
of livestock production, particularly in developing countries, livestock water demand
is projected to increase 71 percent from 1995 to 2025 (Table 4.2). Livestock water
demand is a very small fraction of total consumptive water use in 1995 at only 2
percent, and increases only slightly to 3 percent by 2025 under BAU. Regionally,
however, livestock can have much larger impacts on water use, and is becoming an
even greater consumer of water, particularly in the developing world.  While live-
stock water demand increases only 19 percent in the developed world, it is projected
to more than double in the developing world, from 22 cubic kilometers in 1995 to
45 cubic kilometers in 2025.
Irrigation Water Demand: Consumptive Use
The potential demand or consumptive use for irrigation water is defined as the irri-
gation water requirement to meet full evapotranspirative demand of all crops includ-
ed in the model, over the full potential irrigated area. Potential demand is thus the
Table 4.5Industrial water use intensity
Industrial water use intensity (m3/$1,000 of GDP)
1995 BAU projection
Region/Country baseline estimates 2010 2025
Asia 16.2 13.9 6.7
China 16.0 12.1 6.2
India 19.6 16.3 7.9
Southeast Asia 20.4 13.4 8.9
South Asia excluding India 18.3 15.6 11.7
Latin America (LA) 10.6 8.7 5.9
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 6.3 6.3 5.8
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 8.4 7.2 5.1
Developed countries 4.3 3.5 2.5
Developing countries 13.2 10.5 6.4
World 5.9 5.1 3.6
Sources: 1995 baseline data for total industrial water consumption are author estimates based on
Shiklomanov (1999) and Gleick (1993) for individual countries and regions; HPDGJ (1989), Qian (1991),
NIHWR (1998), and CMWR (199098) for river basins in China; USGS (1998) for river basins in the
United States; ESCAP (1995) and IMWR (19982000) for river basins in India. 2025 data are IMPACT-
WATER projections, 2002. GDP for all years is from World Bank (1998).
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; m3, cubic meters; GDP, gross domestic product.
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demand for irrigation water in the absence of any water supply constraints. Actual
irrigation consumptive use is the realized water demand, given the limitations of
water supply for irrigation. The proportion of potential demand realized in actual
consumptive use is the irrigation water supply reliability index (IWSR), which is
defined as the ratio of water supply available for irrigation over potential demand
for irrigation water. The average potential and actual irrigation water demands and
the IWSR resulting from the 30 climate scenarios are shown in Table 4.6. Compared
with other sectors, the growth of irrigation water potential demand is much lower,
with 12 percent growth in potential demand during 1995–2025 in developing
countries, and a slight decline in potential demand in developed countries.  
Under BAU, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is projected to have the highest per-
centage increase in potential irrigation water demand, at 27 percent, while Latin
America (LA) experiences the second highest growth, at 21 percent. Each of these
regions has a high percentage increase in irrigated area from a relatively small 1995
level. India is projected to have by far the highest absolute growth in potential irri-
gation water demand—66 cubic kilometers (17 percent)—given relatively rapid
growth in irrigated area from an already high 1995 level. WANA increases by 18
percent (28 cubic kilometers, mainly in Turkey), and China experiences a much
smaller increase of 4 percent (12 cubic kilometers).
Water for Irrigation: Increasing Scarcity
Actual consumptive use of irrigation water worldwide is projected to grow more
slowly than potential consumptive use, with an increase of only 4 percent (Table
4.6). In developing countries, consumptive use for irrigation increases from 1,164
cubic kilometers in 1995 to 1,216 cubic kilometers in 2025, an increase of 4 per-
cent. This is of critical importance because irrigation water demand in developing
countries is projected to be increasingly supply-constrained, with a declining frac-
tion of potential demand being met over time.
For developing countries, the IWSR declines from 0.81 in 1995 to 0.75 in
2025 (Table 4.6). Relatively dry basins that face rapid growth in domestic and indus-
trial demand, or experience slow improvement in river basin efficiency, or have rapid
expansion in potential irrigated area without adequate increase in storage or with-
drawal capacity, show even greater declines in water supply reliability. For example,
in China's Yellow River basin, which mainly grows wheat and maize, the IWSR is
projected to decline from 0.80 to 0.75, and in the Ganges of India the IWSR
declines from 0.83 to 0.67. More severe increases in water scarcity occur in both
China and India than in the developing countries as a whole.
In the developed world, water-scarce basins such as the Colorado and White-
Red basins in the United States also face increasing water scarcity in the future.
Developed countries as a whole, however, show a sharp contrast to the developing
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world in that their irrigation water supply is projected to grow faster than potential
demand, partially compensating at the global level for shortfalls in the developing
world. Over the full projection period, irrigation water supply in the developed
world increases by 5.2 cubic kilometers, while the corresponding demand decreas-
es by 4.6 cubic kilometers. Irrigation demand in the developed world as a whole
declines because basin efficiency increases sufficiently to more than offset the very
small increase in irrigated area. As a result, after initially declining from 0.87 to 0.85
in 2010, the IWSR improves to 0.90 in 2025 as a result of slowing domestic and
industrial demand growth in later years (and actual declines in total domestic and
industrial water use in the United States and Europe) and improved efficiency in
irrigation water use. The divergence between trends in developing and developed
countries indicates that agricultural water shortages become worse in the former even
as they improve in the latter, providing a major impetus for the expansion in vir-
tual water transfers through agricultural trade.
By 2025 under BAU, basins and countries with IWSR values less than 0.75 (a
25 percent water shortage relative to potential irrigation demand) include the
Huaihe River basin, Haihe River basin, the Yellow River basin, most basins in
India (including the Ganges River basin), as well as basins in central Asia, and most
countries in LA, SSA, and WANA. IWSR remains above 85 percent in most devel-
oped countries and basins because of slow growth or declining water demand for
domestic and industrial uses; however, even when the IWSR remains relatively high
over time, irrigation is susceptible to considerable downside risk. Some basins in the
United States, including the Colorado, Rio Grande, downstream Mississippi,
Missouri, Texas Gulf, and White-Red-Arkansas River basins have an IWSR as low
as 0.60 in some dry years in the latter stages of the projection period, which means
as much as 40 percent of irrigation water demand cannot be satisfied in those years.
River basins in northern China display different water supply trends than
those in the south. The ratio of irrigation water supply to demand in northern China
is projected to remain below 0.8 in most years, and falls as low as 0.50 in some dry
years. Southern China has IWSR values above 0.85 in most years, although this ratio
falls as low as 0.50 in some particularly dry years.
The IWSR falls as low as 0.30 to 0.40 in some basins in western and north-
western India, particularly after 2015. Dramatic drops to approximately 30 percent
may occur in some dry years or years with uneven intrayear rainfall distribution in
other Indian basins. For the major cereal production basin, the Ganges, the IWSR
is projected to decline from 0.83 in 1995 to below 0.67 percent by 2025.
LA countries maintain their base year water supply reliability under BAU,
which measures below 0.75 in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, and 0.79
percent in other LA countries—with Mexico undergoing slight declines. SSA coun-
tries, however, are projected to have widely varying agricultural water supply 
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conditions. Nigeria has a low reliability of 0.57 along with considerable downside
variance, and northern SSA undergoes a slight decline from 0.74 in 1995 to 0.69
in 2025. Central and western SSA undergo a larger decline from 0.90 to 0.80, while
southern and eastern SSA maintain an average annual reliability of 0.77 with a rel-
atively high variance. In WANA, the year-to-year variability is relatively small, but
all countries experience declining reliability over the projection period with a
decrease of 3 percent in Egypt, 4 percent in Turkey, and 5 percent in other coun-
tries in WANA.
Among South Asian countries, Bangladesh experiences the highest variance in
water supply reliability with an average of around 75 percent between 1995 and
2010, declining to 70 percent between 2010 and 2025. Pakistan and other South
Asian countries (excluding India) have relatively low variances, but average reliability
is projected to decline from 80 to 70 percent in Pakistan and from 88 to 83 per-
cent in other countries.
All Southeast Asian countries have high water supply reliability with averages
between 0.67 and 0.88, depending on the country and time period. Water supply
variances are also high and widen in the latter years of the projection period. In east
Asia, excluding China, South Korea is projected to have a high variance in annual
water supply reliability and a high average of 0.78 to 0.96.
Causes of Water Supply Constraints
Water shortages are caused by different factors in different countries. In the mod-
eling framework, the causes of water shortages can be classified as source limits and
infrastructure constraints. Source limits for irrigation water supply may come from
fluctuation of natural sources (precipitation and runoff ), and from increased non-
irrigation water demands including domestic, industrial, and environmental water
demand. Infrastructure constraints can be caused by insufficient reservoir storage
or withdrawal facilities. The relative importance of these factors in a specific basin
can help prioritize the need for different water development policies including
infrastructure investment and policy reform that enhance basin efficiency. In the
model, the relative importance of these factors can be identified through the con-
straint equations related to each of the factors such as infrastructure capacity, envi-
ronmental requirements, and source balance. After the model is solved, the status
of all the constraints and the IWSR can be examined. If the IWSR is below 0.95
and one of the corresponding constraints is contingent (reaching the lower or upper
bound), then we conclude that the water shortage is caused by the factor(s) with
the contingent constraint(s). For example, if the IWSR is 0.85, and the water sup-
ply reaches the source limit, then the water shortage is caused by the source limit.
In the United States, source limits occur in the Rio Grande and Colorado River
basins in some dry years. Late in the projection period, the Missouri, Texas Gulf,
and White-Red-Arkansas River basins may suffer water shortages of up to 40 per-
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cent in some dry years to maintain non-irrigation demands and environmental water
requirements. Australia also has source shortages in some dry years. In China, seri-
ous source shortages are possible in the Haihe River basin, inland basins of north-
west China, the Yellow River basin, and the Huaihe River basin. The Huaihe River
basin and the Yellow River basin also have infrastructure constraints in some dry
years (when water requirement from irrigation is large to make up for lack of rain-
fall) because the limits of withdrawal capacity are reached. Although it is seeming-
ly paradoxical that withdrawal capacity could be a constraint when water supply is
low, low rainfall also increases the proportion of crop water demand that must be
met from irrigation. Basins in south and southeast China experience a dramatic drop
(as much as 50 percent) in water supply in some years because of lack of storage
capacity to deliver water during the dry season.
Infrastructure constraints cause water shortages of as much as 60–70 percent
in some basins in western and northwestern India after 2015, especially because of
insufficient reservoir storage. The same problem could occur in some basins in
southern and eastern India where internal rainfall distribution is uneven. The
Ganges River basin is also constrained by storage and water withdrawal capacity in
later years, particularly after 2015.
Many LA countries face water withdrawal capacity constraints, with Mexico
and Argentina requiring more storage for intra and interyear regulation in later years.
The countries in WANA require more storage (with the exception of Egypt), and
Turkey is also constrained by the water withdrawal capacity limit. Egypt has sub-
stantial source problems under BAU, particularly after 2010. All regions of SSA and
most Asian countries need more storage or larger withdrawal capacity to meet
growing demands for water. For other developed countries and regions (including
western and eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Oceania, and Japan) agricultural
water shortages occur in some dry years, mainly as a result of the need to meet envi-
ronmental and other non-irrigation demands and water withdrawal capacity limi-
tations.
Variability in Irrigation Water Demand and Supply
Climate variability leads to variability and risk to irrigation water supply availabil-
ity under existing and projected water supply infrastructure. Low rainfall years can
lead to severe water shortages even in regions in which water is relatively plentiful
in most years. Water supply variability in a specific year can be assessed based on
the multiple climate simulations or through changes in year-to-year variation in sup-
ply for a single climate run. Variability in irrigation water supply tends to be high-
er at smaller spatial scales because as the size of the spatial unit increases, local
variability within the component units of the larger spatial unit is often counter-
balanced by negative covariation between the component spatial units. This 
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tendency is shown in Figure 4.1, which shows the standard deviation in irrigation
water supplies from the 30 different climate scenarios at three spatial scales, the Luni
River basin in India, India, and the world. The variability, as shown by the stan-
dard deviation in irrigation water supply, decreases as spatial scale increases.
However, it is important to note that variability in irrigation water supply increas-
es over time at all spatial scales. From 1995 to 2025, the standard deviation (vari-
ance divided by mean) of irrigation water supply increases from 4.1 percent to 5.0
percent in the world, 7.2 percent to 9.4 percent in India, and 34.2 percent to 37.2
percent in the Indian Luni River basin. Figure 4.2 shows the increase in variability
even more dramatically for the year-to-year irrigation water supply in the Indian
Ganges River basin under the climate regime of 1961–90. Irrigation water supply
variability in the Ganges—and more generally in many relatively dry basins—
becomes larger in later years because of the increase in non–irrigation water demand
combined with water supply constraints—further illustrated below.
Figure 4.1—Coefficient of variation of irrigation water supply for the
world, India, and the Indian Luni River Basin
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
Note: Coefficient of variation is the ratio of standard deviation over the average
irrigation water supply.
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The degree and impact of irrigation water supply variability depends on climate
variability, the degree of water scarcity, and the adequacy of water supply infra-
structure. It is a fundamental problem that, in general, irrigation water supply vari-
ability increases precisely in those basins in which water scarcity is severe and
increasing, such as river basins in the western United States, WANA, and northern
China and India. Under these conditions, natural climate variability can cause
severe shortages in irrigation water supply. On the other hand, in basins where water
supply is relatively plentiful, the impact of climate variability may be low because
inadequate water storage and withdrawal facilities are the dominant constraint on
water supply even in dry years. In such basins or countries, annual climate variability
barely affects agricultural water supply, although further development of water sup-
ply infrastructure raises water supply variability along with the average supply level
from the climatic variability at higher levels of water supply. Nigeria typifies this sit-
uation, where the variability in irrigation water supply is very small until late in the
projection period, when growth in both demand and supply bring source limita-
tions into play. Figure 4.3 shows the average irrigation water consumption and the
coefficient of variation in Nigeria. As can be seen, the variability increases with years.
This can be explained by Figure 4.4, which presents water withdrawal capacity, com-
puted average water withdrawal, and withdrawal under a single one climate scenario.
In earlier years, actual water withdrawal reaches the capacity, and with  little or no
variability in water withdrawal. With the increase of water withdrawal capacity, vari-
ability with the actual water withdrawal increases, which leads to some significant
variability in later years.
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
Figure 4.2—Irrigation water depletion in the Indian Ganges River
Basin under the climate regime of 1961–90
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Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
Figure 4.3—Coefficient of variation of irrigation water supply and
the average supply in Nigeria during 1995–2025
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Figure 4.4—Comparison of withdrawal capacity, average computed
withdrawal, and withdrawal under one hydrologic scenario under
the climate regime of 1961–90
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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WATER PRODUCTIVITY
One important strategy to increase food production in the face of increasing water
scarcity is to increase the water productivity3 (Molden 1997; Molden, Sakthivadivel,
and Habib 2001; Barker and Kijne 2001). Water productivity (WP) is defined more
specifically as crop yield (P) per cubic meter of water consumption including “green”
water (effective rainfall) for rainfed areas and both green and “blue” water (divert-
ed water from water systems) for irrigated areas (Equation 4.1). Water consump-
tion (WC) includes beneficial (BWC) and nonbeneficial (NBWC) consumption
(Equation 4.2). BWC directly contributes to crop growth at a river basin scale, and
NBWC includes distribution and conveyance losses to evaporation and sinks, which
are not economically reusable. BWC is characterized by water use efficiency in agri-
culture. 
We use effective efficiency at the river basin scale, or basin efficiency (BE),
(Keller, Keller, and Seckler 1996) to represent water use efficiency, which is a ratio
of BWC to WC. 
P(kg)WP(kg / m3) = ——— (4.1)WC(m3)
BWC
WC = BWC + NBWC = ——— (4.2)
BE
Water productivity, defined above, varies from region to region and field to
field, depending on many factors such as crop and climate patterns (if rainfall fits
crop growth), irrigation technology and field water management, land and infra-
structure, and input including labor, fertilizer, and machinery. Water productivity
can be increased by either increasing crop yield (that is, increasing the numerator
in Equation 4.1 through other inputs while maintaining constant water use level,
or reducing water consumption and maintaining the yield level (that is, decreasing
denominator), or both. 
Water Productivity in 1995
Figure 4.5 shows a global map of water productivity of irrigated rice, and Figure 4.6
shows a similar map of water productivity for irrigated cereals excluding rice. The
basic elements of these maps are 36 countries and aggregated regions used in
IMPACT (Rosegrant et al. 2001). Because rice usually consumes more water than
other crops, the water productivity of rice is significantly lower than that of other
cereals. The water productivity of rice ranges from 0.15 to 0.60 kilograms per cubic
meter, while that of other cereals ranges from 0.20 to 2.40 kilograms per cubic meter.
For both rice and other cereals, water productivity in SSA is the lowest in the
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world. The water productivity of rice is 0.10–0.25 kilograms per cubic meter in this
region, with average yield of 1.4 metric tons per hectare and water consumption per
hectare close to 9,500 cubic meters. For other cereals in SSA, the average yield is
2.40 metric tons per hectare, the water consumption per hectare is 7,700 cubic
meters, and the average water productivity is 0.30 kilograms per cubic meter (rang-
ing from 0.10 to 0.60 kilograms per cubic meter). Among developing countries,
China and some Southeast Asian countries have higher water productivity for rice,
ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 kilograms per cubic meter; however, the average for the
developed world, 0.47 kilograms per cubic meter, is higher than the 0.39 kilograms
per cubic meter for the developing world. For other cereals, water productivity is
lower than 0.4 kilograms per cubic meter in South Asia, central Asia, northern and
central SSA; ranges from 1.0–1.7 kilograms per cubic meter in China, the United
States, and Brazil; and ranges from 1.7–2.4 kilograms per cubic meter in western
European countries. The average water productivity of other cereals in the devel-
oped world is 1.0 kilograms per cubic meter, while in the developing world it is 0.56
kilograms per cubic meter.
N
Figure 4.5—Water productivity of rice, 1995
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments, 2002.
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It should be noted that because of the level of aggregation, the numbers shown
on these maps do not show the variation of water productivity within individual
countries. Within some large countries, water productivity varies significantly.
Figure 4.7 shows the water productivity of all cereals excluding rice in major river
basins in China, India, and the United States. In China, water productivity for non-
rice cereals ranges from 0.4 to 1.4 kilograms per cubic meter, with higher water pro-
ductivity in the Yangtze River basin and northeast China (the Song-Liao River
basin). Crop yields in these areas are relatively higher and water availability is rela-
tively less restricted. However, in India, where nonrice cereal productivity ranges
from 0.2 to 0.7 kilograms per cubic meter, higher water productivity occurs in the
north (0.4–0.7 kilograms per cubic meter), where crop yield is higher but water
availability is more restricted than in other areas. In the United States, water pro-
ductivity ranges from 0.9–1.9 kilograms per cubic meter, with higher values in the
north than in the south, and the highest in the northwestern regions.
Figure 4.6—Water productivity of total cereals excluding rice, 1995
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments, 2002.
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Changes In Water Productivity between 1995 and 2025
To show the year-to-year variability of water productivity between 1995 and 2025,
we report BAU results with one hydrologic regime, which regenerates the month-
ly hydrologic records for 1961–90. Our projections of water productivity show vari-
ation from 1995 to 2025 for both irrigated rice and other cereals, both in developed
and developing countries and worldwide (Figures 4.8 and 4.9). This year-to-year
variation is caused by climate variability, which affects water availability, and thus
water productivity. Based on assumptions of area and yield growth and water sup-
ply enhancement, water productivities are projected to increase significantly between
1995 and 2025. For example, water productivity of other cereals will increase from
1.0 to 1.4 kilograms per cubic meter in developed countries, 0.6 to 1.0 kilograms
per cubic meter in developing countries, 0.7 to 1.1 kilograms per cubic meter 
globally.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 compare crop yield and water consumption between
1995 and 2025 for rice and other cereals, respectively, to give insight into the major
cause of water productivity increases over the period. As can be seen, crop yield
increases and water consumption per hectare decreases.  Water consumption per
hectare depends on the change in total consumption and the change in crop area.
Figure 4.8—Water productivity of irrigated rice, 1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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Figure 4.9—Water productivity of irrigated cereals excluding rice,
1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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The model projects a relatively small increase in irrigated cereal crop area at 24 mil-
lion hectares (10 percent) worldwide from 1995 to 2025. Total realized crop water
consumption is further determined by the change in water withdrawal capacity,
basin efficiency, rainfall harvest, crop consumption requirements, and the amount
of water taken by non-irrigation sectors. Under BAU, total global water with-
drawals are projected to increase by 23 percent from 1995 to 2025, with the
increase mainly used for non-irrigation sectors (increasing by 62 percent worldwide
from 1995 to 2025), leading to an increase in total consumption. Water con-
sumption can be reduced, however, because the projected increase of effective river
basin water use efficiency will decrease crop demand. All of these factors result in
a 3.9 percent increase in consumptive water use for irrigation worldwide. Overall,
as can be seen in Figures 4.10 and 4.11, the change of water consumption per
hectare is small compared with the change of crop yield. The increase of water pro-
ductivity results mainly from increases in crop yield.
Water productivity for irrigated crops is higher than that of rainfed crops in
developing countries (Figures 4.12 and 4.13). The difference becomes larger over
time because of the higher increase in irrigated yield and the increase in water use
efficiency over time. However, the water productivity of irrigated crops is not high-
er than that of rainfed crops everywhere in the world. As observed in Figures 4.14
Figure 4.10—Crop yield and water consumption of rice per hectare,
1995 and 2025
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(b) Water consumption per hectare
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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Figure 4.11—Crop yield and water consumption of cereals excluding
rice per hectare, 1995 and 2025
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(b) Water consumption
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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Figure 4.12—Water productivity for irrigated and rainfed rice in
developing countries, 1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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Figure 4.13—Water productivity for irrigated and rainfed cereals
excluding rice in developing countries, 1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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Figure 4.14—Water productivity for irrigated and rainfed rice in
developed countries, 1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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and 4.15, the curve of irrigated crops is below the curve of rainfed crops in devel-
oped countries for both rice and other cereals over the same period. This indicates
the existence of relatively favorable rainfall conditions for crop growth and high rain-
fed crop yields associated with infrastructure and other inputs to rainfed crops in
developed countries, compared with those in developing countries. 
THE FUTURE FOR FOOD 
Food Demand
With slowing population growth rates and increasing diversification of diets away
from cereals given rising prosperity and changing dietary preferences, annual growth
in cereal demand is projected to decline worldwide to 1.3 percent between 1995
and 2025 from 2.2 percent in 1965–95 (and 1.7 percent, 1970–2000).
Nevertheless, the projected absolute increase in cereal demand of 828 million met-
ric tons (Table 4.7) is nearly as large as the 846 million metric ton increase of the
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2
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Figure 4.15—Water productivity for irrigated and rainfed cereals
excluding rice in developed countries, 1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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preceding 30 years. Growth in food demand is concentrated in developing coun-
tries, which also undergo a change in the composition of cereal demand from ris-
ing incomes and rapid urbanization. Per capita food consumption of maize and
coarse grains declines as consumers shift to wheat and rice, livestock products, and
fruits and vegetables. In much of Asia, an additional shift occurs from rice to wheat.
The projected strong growth in meat consumption, in turn, substantially increases
cereal consumption for animal feed, particularly maize. The developing country
presence in global food markets increases substantially. Under BAU, 86 percent of
the projected increase in global cereal consumption between 1995 and 2025 comes
from developing countries. Because of their larger, more urbanized populations and
rapid economic growth, developing countries in Asia account for just over half the
increase in global demand for cereals, with China alone accounting for one-quarter
(Table 4.7).
Global demand for meat will grow much faster than that for cereals. Worldwide,
demand for meat is forecast to increase by 70 percent between 1995 and 2025, with
86 percent of the increase occurring in developing countries, where meat demand
more than doubles over 30 years (Table 4.8). China alone accounts for 39 percent
of this increase, compared with India's 4 percent.  
Poultry accounts for 41 percent of the global increase in demand for meat under
BAU, reaching 33 percent of total meat demand in 2025, significantly higher than
the 28 percent of total meat it accounted for in 1995, reflecting a dramatic shift in
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taste from red meat to chicken. Increasingly, cereal crops are grown for animal feed
to fuel the explosive rise in demand for meat rather than for direct human con-
sumption. As a result, maize rises in importance relative to wheat and rice, account-
ing for 45 percent of the incremental cereal demand during 1995–2025 and
reaching 35 percent of total cereal demand in 2025 compared with 31 percent in
1995. Soybeans and meals also show fast demand growth, increasing by 77 percent
and 70 percent, respectively, between 1995 and 2025 (Table 4.8).
Demand growth for noncereal staple food commodities is also strong in devel-
oping countries under BAU. In many parts of SSA, roots and tubers—especially cas-
sava, sweet potatoes, and yams—are a major source of sustenance. In the late 1990s,
they accounted for 20 percent of calorie consumption in the region, with an even
higher concentration in the diets of the poor. In much of Asia and LA, roots and
tubers provide an important, supplemental source of carbohydrates, vitamins, and
amino acids in food systems that are dominated by other commodities. These pat-
terns are projected to continue, with total root and tuber demand in the develop-
ing world increasing by 65 percent (282 million tons) between 1995 and 2025. SSA
is projected to account for 47 percent of this increase, indicating that roots and
tubers will continue to be of crucial importance to the diet in that region (Table 4.8).
Asia also accounts for a significant amount of the total increase, with east Asia
accounting for 21 percent, and South Asia 14 percent.  
Production, Area, and Yield
Production growth in meat, soybeans, meals, and roots and tubers generally follows
the trends in demand growth (Table 4.9). However, for meats, meals, and roots and
tubers, production growth in developing countries as a group is somewhat slower
than demand growth, which leads to increasing imports as shown below. Soybean
production growth lags demand in Asia, but outpaces demand growth in LA.
Cereal production in developing countries as a group will not keep pace with
increases in demand. Cereal harvested area is expected to grow only slowly in the
coming decades, by 0.40 percent per year in developing countries and 0.29 percent
per year in the world as a whole (Table 4.10). Both irrigated and rainfed cereal areas
harvested grow slowly, as will be discussed in more detail below. A large share of the
most suitable land is already under cultivation, and factors limiting further land
expansion include the slow projected growth of irrigation investment (see below),
soil degradation, and rapid urbanization leading to conversion of cropland for
other uses. The primary constraint to further crop area expansion is not purely a
physical limit, however, but rather the projected flat or slowly declining real cereal
prices that render expansion of cropland unprofitable in many cases (see discussion
of cereal prices below). In Asia, cereal area is projected to increase by only 8 million
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hectares, with an actual decline in rainfed cereal area (Table 4.10). SSA and LA have
more potential for area expansion, with area under cereal production projected to
expand by 30 million hectares in SSA (of which 28 million is rainfed area) and by
16 million hectares in LA during 1995–2025 (Table 4.10). 
With slow growth in area, increases in cereal production are thus highly depend-
ent on increases in productivity. But increases in crop yields are slowing across all
cereals and all regions, with the notable exception of SSA, where yields are project-
ed to recover from past stagnation. Yield growth rates in most of the world have been
slowing since the early 1980s. In the developed world, the slowdown was primari-
ly policy-induced, as North American and European governments reduced cereal
stocks and scaled back farm-price support programs in favor of direct payments to
farmers, while in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union economic collapse
and subsequent economic reforms further depressed productivity. Factors con-
tributing to the slowdown in cereal productivity growth in developing countries,
particularly in Asia, include high levels of input use (meaning that it takes increas-
ing input requirements to sustain yield gains), slowing public investment in crop
research and irrigation infrastructure, and growing water shortages as irrigation
development slows and nonagricultural water demand diverts water from agricul-
ture. This slowdown is projected to continue, with the global yield growth rate for
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Table 4.10Irrigated and rainfed cereal area under the business-as-usual 
scenario, 1995 and 2025
Irrigated area Rainfed area Total cereal area
(million ha) (million ha) (million ha)
1995 2025 1995 2025 1995 2025
baseline BAU baseline BAU baseline BAU
Region/Country estimates projections estimates projections estimates projections
Asia 152.9 168.5 136.9 129.4 289.7 297.9
China 62.4 67.1 26.2 29.0 88.6 96.1
India 37.8 47.1 62.3 48.9 100.1 96.0
Southeast Asia 19.2 20.3 29.8 32.2 48.9 52.5
South Asia excluding India 19.9 21.0 5.6 5.5 25.5 26.5
Latin America (LA) 7.5 9.8 41.8 55.6 49.3 65.4
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 3.3 4.9 69.8 97.7 73.0 102.6
West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 9.8 10.8 34.0 36.0 43.7 46.8
Developed countries 41.8 44.9 192.1 195.7 233.9 240.6
Developing countries 171.3 192.6 282.2 318.5 453.5 511.1
World 213.1 237.5 474.3 514.12 687.4 751.7
Sources:  1995 baseline data are based on FAO (1999) for cereals in developing countries and Cai and
Rosegrant (1999) for crops in basins in the United States, China, and India, and noncereal crops in all
countries and regions. 2025 data are IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates busines-as-usual scenario; million ha, million hectares.
all cereals declining from 1.5 percent per year during 1982–95 to 1.0 percent per
year during 1995–2025; and average crop yield growth in developing countries,
declining from 1.9 percent per year to 1.2 percent.
Growing water shortages are a particularly important source of yield growth
decline, and a declining fraction of this irrigation water demand is met over time
because irrigation water supply is increasingly being constrained, as indicated in the
IWSR discussion above. Increasing water scarcity for irrigation directly contributes
to slowing cereal yield growth in developing countries, as can be seen in the pro-
jected relative crop yields for irrigated cereal. Relative crop yield is the ratio of pro-
jected crop yield to the maximum economically attainable yield at given crop and
input prices under zero water stress conditions. The fall in the relative crop yield
index significantly hinders future yield growth. For developing countries as a group
in 2025, the drop from 0.86 to 0.75 represents an annual 0.68 million tons per
hectare in crop yield foregone through increased water stress or an annual loss of
cereal production of 130 million metric tons—equivalent to China's annual rice
crop and double the U.S. wheat crop in the late 1990s (Table 4.12).  
Table 4.11Irrigated and rainfed cereal yield under the business-as-usual sce-
nario, 1995 and 2025
Irrigated yield Rainfed yield Total cereal yield
(mt/ha) (mt/ha) (mt/ha)
1995 2025 1995 2025 1995 2025
baseline BAU baseline BAU baseline BAU
Region/Country estimates projections estimates projections estimates projections
Asia 3.23 4.57 1.70 2.50 2.51 3.67
China 4.23 6.02 3.59 4.74 4.04 5.64
India 2.65 3.74 1.20 1.65 1.75 2.67
Southeast Asia 3.05 4.39 1.61 2.53 2.17 3.25
South Asia excluding India 2.19 3.34 1.24 1.94 1.98 3.05
Latin America (LA) 4.07 5.66 2.07 3.00 2.37 3.40
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 2.16 3.23 0.85 1.25 0.91 1.34
West Asia/North Africa 
(WANA) 3.58 4.91 1.40 1.85 1.88 2.56
Developed countries 4.44 6.13 3.17 3.96 3.39 4.36
Developing countries 3.25 4.60 1.51 2.13 2.17 3.06
World 3.48 4.89 2.18 2.83 2.58 3.48
Sources: 1995 baseline data are based on FAO (1999) for cereals in developing countries and Cai and
Rosegrant (1999) for crops in basins in the United States, China, and India, and noncereal crops in all
countries and regions. 2025 data are IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates busines-as-usual scenario; mt/ha, metric tons per hectare.
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Table 4.12Relative irrigated cereal crop yields under the business-as-usual
scenario, 1995 and 2025
Relative irrigated cereal crop yields
Region/Country 1995 baseline estimates 2025 BAU projections
Asia 0.87 0.76
China 0.89 0.78
India 0.84 0.72
Southeast Asia 0.97 0.87
South Asia excluding India 0.87 0.73
Latin America (LA) 0.94 0.76
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 0.96 0.77
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 0.68 0.57
Developed countries 0.89 0.87
Developing countries 0.86 0.75
World 0.87 0.77
Sources: Authors' estimates and IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Note: BAU indicates busines-as-usual scenario. 
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International Trade and Prices 
By 2020 under BAU, with developing countries unable to meet cereal demand from
their own production, international trade becomes even more vital in providing food
to many regions of the globe. Net cereal import demand from the developing
world is projected to increase from 107 million metric tons in 1995 to 245 million
metric tons in 2025, with Asian nations—particularly China—boosting their
imports enormously. Developing countries as a group also increase their imports
of meat and roots and tubers, and shift from net exporters of meals to net importers.
Asia significantly increases the import of soybeans, while LA dramatically increas-
es soybean exports (Table 4.13).
The substitution of cereal and other food imports for irrigated agricultural pro-
duction (so-called imports of “virtual water”) can be an effective means for reduc-
ing agricultural water use (Allan 1996). The virtual water concept is based on the
principle of comparative advantage in international trade. Maize is exported from
the United States in significant part because it can be grown without irrigation given
the exceptionally favorable agroclimatic conditions of the “corn belt.” Water-scarce
countries, such as much of WANA, have a disadvantage in growing water-inten-
sive crops such as cereals, and could improve water availability for other crops and
other sectors by increasing their reliance on cereal imports. Countries with relatively
plentiful water, such as Viet Nam, Thailand, and Myanmar, in turn have a com-
parative advantage in exporting water-intensive crops, like rice, to water-scarce
countries (IWMI 2000).  
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BAU shows the vital importance of trade in relation to virtual water. The
increase in developing country cereal imports by 138 million metric tons between
1995 and 2025 is equivalent to saving 147 cubic kilometers of water at 2025 water
productivity levels, or 8 percent of total water consumption and 12 percent of irri-
gation water consumption in developing countries in 2025. The water (and land)
savings from projected large increases in food imports by developing countries are
particularly beneficial if they are the result of strong economic growth that gener-
ates the necessary foreign exchange to pay for the food imports. However, even when
rapidly growing food imports are primarily a result of rapid income growth, they
often act as a warning signal to national policymakers concerned with heavy reliance
on world markets, and can induce pressure for trade restrictions that can threaten
growth and food security in the longer term. More serious food security problems
arise when high food imports are the result of slow agricultural and economic
development that fails to keep pace with basic food demand growth driven by pop-
ulation growth. Under these conditions, it may be impossible to finance the required
imports on a continuing basis, further deteriorating the ability to bridge the gap
between food consumption and food required for basic livelihood. As such, “hot
spots” for food trade gaps occur in SSA, where cereal imports are projected to more
than triple by 2025 to 35 million metric tons, and in WANA, where cereal imports
are projected to increase from 38 million metric tons in 1995 to 83 million metric
tons in 2025. The reliance on water-saving cereal imports in WANA makes eco-
nomic and environmental sense, but must be supported by enhanced nonagricul-
tural growth. It is highly unlikely that SSA could finance the projected level of
imports internally; instead international financial or food aid would be required.
Failure to finance these imports would further increase food insecurity and pressure
on water resources in this region.
Sharp decreases in food prices over the last three decades were a great benefit
to the poor, who spend a large share of income on food. Real world prices of wheat,
rice, and maize fell by 47, 59, and 61 percent, respectively, between 1970 and 2000.
But international cereal prices are projected to decline much more slowly during
the next two decades, a significant break from past trends, with a projected increase
in the price of maize (Table 4.14). Prices of meat and other commodities also
decline far less than in previous decades. This tighter predicted future price scenario
indicates additional shocks to the agricultural sector—particularly shortfalls in
meeting agricultural water and other input demands—that could seriously pressure
food prices upward.  
Irrigated and Rainfed Production, 1995
Rainfed and irrigated cereal area and yield for the 1995 baseline were estimated based
on data from FAO (1999) and Cai and Rosegrant (1999).4 Figures 4.16 to 4.18
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Table 4.14World food prices under the business-as-usual scenario, 1995 and
2025
World food prices (US$/mt)
Commodity 1995 baseline estimates 2025 BAU projections
Rice 285 221
Wheat  133 119
Maize 103 104
Other coarse grains 97 82
Beef 1,808 1,660
Pork 2,304 2,070
Sheep 2,918 2,621
Poultry 735 700
Potatoes 209 180
Sweet potatoes 134 90
Other roots and tubers 106 81
Soybeans 247 257
Meals 199 262
Sources: 1995 baseline data are based on FAO (1998c), IMF (1997), USDA-NASS (1998), and World
Bank (1997). 2025 data are IMPACT-WATER projections, 2002.
Note: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; US$/mt, U.S. dollars per metric ton.
Figure 4.16—Cereal area, 1995
Source: Author estimates based on FAO (1999) and Cai and Rosegrant (1999).
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Figure 4.17—Cereal yield, 1995
Source: Author estimates based on FAO (1999) and Cai and Rosegrant (1999).
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Figure 4.18—Cereal production, 1995
Source: Author estimates based on FAO (1999) and Cai and Rosegrant (1999).
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show rainfed and irrigated cereal area, yield, and production in selected countries
and aggregated regions in 1995. Developing countries rely substantially more on
irrigated agriculture than developed countries, with 38 percent of all cereal area irri-
gated, accounting for 59 percent of total cereal production. Conversely, only 18 per-
cent of all cereal area is irrigated in the developed world, accounting for 23 percent
of total cereal production. Rainfed cereal yield in the developed world is almost dou-
ble the rainfed yield in the developing world, and is only slightly lower than the irri-
gated yield in the developing world. As a result, rainfed cereal production in the
developed world contributes 59 percent of global rainfed production, and 34 per-
cent of total cereal production. 
For some countries and regions with an arid or semi-arid climate, the fraction
of rainfed crops is very low, for example, zero percent of the cereal area harvested
in Egypt and 7.4 percent in Pakistan is rainfed.5 Because rice is the dominant crop
in Japan and South Korea, rainfed cereal harvested area occupies only 10 and 16
percent, respectively, of the total area harvested. Other countries in which the frac-
tion of rainfed harvested cereal area is below 50 percent include Bangladesh, China,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Viet Nam. The fraction of rainfed cereal harvested area
in Nigeria, all SSA countries, and some South American countries such as Argentina
and Brazil is over 90 percent, while in LA as a whole the percentage is a slightly lower
85 percent.  
Globally, 69 percent of cereal area planted is rainfed including 40 percent of
rice, 66 percent of wheat, 82 percent of maize, 86 percent of other grains, and 85
percent of soybeans. The global rainfed harvested area of rice, wheat, maize, other
cereals, soybeans, potatoes, sweet potatoes, and cassava and other roots is 560 mil-
lion hectares in 1995, with cereals representing 85 percent of this total.  Worldwide
rainfed cereal yield is about 2.2 metric tons per hectare, which is about 65 percent
of the irrigated yield. Rainfed cereal production accounts for 58 percent of world-
wide cereal production.
Globally, the harvested area of rice is 146 million hectares, of which approxi-
mately 87 million hectares are irrigated, and 59 million hectares are rainfed.
Developed countries plant very little rainfed rice, while it occupies approximately
42 percent, or 59 million hectares of the total rice area, in developing countries.
Developing countries are also responsible for almost all production worldwide, with
97 percent of the total world rice yield coming from those countries. Rainfed rice
yield in developing countries is 1.4 tons per hectare or about 44 percent of the total
irrigated rice yield in developing countries; this amounts to 24 percent of the devel-
oping country total, and 23 percent of world production.
In 1995, 222 million hectares of wheat was harvested globally, 66 percent of
which was rainfed, the remaining 34 percent irrigated. About 83 percent of the area
planted to wheat in developed countries was rainfed, while in developing countries
slightly less than half the total wheat area planted was rainfed. Rainfed wheat yields
in developed and developing countries are approximately 2.5 and 1.2 tons per
hectare, respectively, while the irrigated yields are slightly higher at 2.9 and 1.7 tons
per hectare, respectively. Rainfed wheat production contributes 33 percent of the
total yield in developing countries, 81 percent in developed countries, and 52 per-
cent worldwide.
Maize is grown under rainfed conditions more often than rice and wheat. Of
the roughly 138 million hectares sown to maize in the world, 82 percent is rainfed,
while 18 percent is irrigated. Over 60 percent of the total maize area worldwide is
in developing countries, where the average rainfed maize yield is 3.4 tons per
hectare; developing countries lag behind at 1.8 tons per hectare. Irrigated yields are
higher at 4.2 tons per hectare in developed countries and 2.9 tons per hectare in
developing countries. Rainfed maize production contributes 66 percent of the total
yield in developing countries, 81 percent in developed countries, and 74 percent
globally.
Global production of other coarse grains including barley, millet, oats, rye, and
sorghum is predominantly rainfed, with 156 million rainfed hectares, accounting
for 86 percent of the total world harvested area. In contrast to wheat and maize,
other grains have a lower fraction of rainfed area in developed countries (80 per-
cent) compared with developing countries (91 percent). The average rainfed yield
of other grains in developed countries is 2.1 tons per hectare, while that of devel-
oping countries is much lower at 0.9 tons per hectare. Irrigated areas yield 3.5 tons
of other grains per hectare in developed countries and 2.2 tons per hectare in devel-
oping countries. Rainfed production of other coarse grains contributes 80 percent
of total yield in developing countries, 71 percent in developed countries, and 74
percent globally.
Approximately 62 million hectares of soybeans are harvested worldwide of
which 53 million hectares are rainfed. Developed countries cultivate 91 percent of
the total soybean area using rainfed agriculture, while 80 percent of the area in devel-
oping countries is rainfed. Unlike cereal crops, rainfed and irrigated soybean yields
are similar. In developed countries, the irrigated soybean yield is 2.7 tons per
hectare, slightly higher than the rainfed yield of 2.2 tons per hectare; in developing
countries the irrigated yield is only slightly higher than the rainfed yield with both
at approximately 1.8 tons per hectare.
Rainfed Agriculture versus Irrigated AgricultureChanges to
2025
Total world irrigated area is projected to increase by 59 million hectares to 420 mil-
lion hectares—just 16 percent—between 1995 and 2025. Cereals accounted for an
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Table 4.15Irrigated and rainfed cereal production under the business-as-
usual scenario, 1995 and 2025
Irrigated production Rainted production Share of rainfed
(million mt) (million mt) production (%)
1995 2025 1995 2025 1995 2025
baseline BAU baseline BAU baseline BAU
Region/Country estimates projections estimates projections estimates projections
Asia 493 769 233 323 32 30
China 264 404 94 138 26 25
India 100 176 75 81 43 31
Southeast Asia 59 89 48 81 45 48
South Asia excluding India 44 70 7 11 14 13
Latin America (LA) 31 55 86 167 74 75
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 7 16 59 122 89 89
West Asia/North 
Africa (WANA) 35 53 48 67 58 56
Developed countries 186 275 608 775 77 74
Developing countries 557 886 425 678 43 43
World 742 1,161 1,033 1,453 58 56
Sources: 1995 baseline data are based on FAO (1999) for cereals in developing countries and Cai and
Rosegrant (1999) for crops in basins in the United States, China, and India. 2025 data are IMPACT-
WATER projections, 2002.
Notes: BAU indicates business-as-usual scenario; million mt, million metric tons.
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estimated 59 percent of world irrigated area in 1995; under BAU, in 2025 they
account for 57 percent. Irrigated cereal area increases by 24.4 million hectares, an
11 percent increase over 1995 levels.  Nearly all of this increase occurs in develop-
ing countries, with the largest increases in India and China. Developed country irri-
gation increases by only 5.4 million hectares, with a 3.1 million hectare increase in
cereal irrigated area. 
A more detailed breakdown of irrigated and rainfed cereal area, yield, and pro-
duction is provided in Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.15. Worldwide, rainfed cereal area
in 2025 is projected to be 514 million hectares, an 8 percent increase over 1995
levels (Table 4.10). Rainfed cereal area accounts for 68 percent of the total harvested
area in 2025, down only slightly from 69 percent in 1995. In developing countries,
the rainfed fraction of total area remains the same as 1995 levels at 62 percent.
Developed countries, on the other hand, show a slight decrease from 82 percent of
the total area planted using rainfed methods in 1995 to 81 percent in 2025.
The global average rainfed cereal yield under BAU is 2.8 metric tons per
hectare in 2025, 30 percent higher than in 1995 (Table 4.11). Globally, irrigated
cereal yield increases even more, with an overall increase of 40 percent (from 3.5
tons per hectare in 1995 to 4.9 tons per hectare in 2025). The developing world
shows a rainfed yield increase of 0.6 metric tons per hectare (a 41 percent increase
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Figure 4.19—Share of irrigated and rainfed production in cereal
production increase under the business-as-usual scenario,
1995–2025
Source: IMPACT-WATER assessments and projections, 2002.
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over 1995 levels), while irrigated yields increase 39 percent (from 3.3 to 4.6 met-
ric tons per hectare). Rainfed yield in the developed world increases 0.8 metric tons
per hectare over the period (an increase of 25 percent), while irrigated yields increase
1.7 metric tons or 38 percent.
Global rainfed production increases 41 percent over 1995 values, while irrigated
production increases 56 percent (Table 4.10). Relative production increases are more
pronounced in developing countries (particularly for rainfed production) at 60 and
59 percent for rainfed and irrigated production, respectively. Developed countries
increase rainfed production by 27 percent, while irrigated production increases by
48 percent. Rainfed production accounts for 56 percent of total cereal production
worldwide, down slightly from 58 percent in 1995. The developing world main-
tains its share of rainfed production (43 percent), and rainfed production in the
developed world slightly decreases its share, from 77 percent in 1995 to 74 percent
in 2025.
Figure 4.19 shows the sources of increased global cereal production during
1995–2025. Under BAU, irrigated and rainfed production each account for about
half the total increase in cereal production between 1995 and 2025. 
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Irrigation plays a dominant role in cereal production in developing countries,
accounting for 57 percent of future cereal production growth in developing coun-
tries and four-fifths of the growth in global irrigated cereal production. The impor-
tance of rainfed cereal production at the global scale is in part a result of the
dominance of rainfed agriculture in developed countries. More than 80 percent of
cereal area in developed countries is rainfed, much of which is highly productive
maize and wheat land such as that in the midwestern United States and parts of
Europe. Rainfed cereal yields in developed countries averaged 3.2 metric tons per
hectare in 1995, nearly as high as irrigated cereal yields in developing countries, and
grow to 4 metric tons per hectare by 2025 under BAU. Rainfed agriculture remains
important in developing countries as well. While rainfed yields in developing coun-
tries only increase from 1.5 metric tons per hectare to 2.1 metric tons per hectare
by 2025, rainfed cereal production still accounts for 43 percent of the developing
country total, the same percentage as in 1995.
SUMMARY
Water demand is projected to grow rapidly, particularly in developing countries.
Irrigation remains the single largest water user over the 30-year projection period,
but the increase in demand is much faster for domestic and industrial uses than for
agriculture. Modeling results under BAU also show declining water supply reliability
and relative crop yields, as well as worsening agricultural production vulnerability
from water scarcity. Food production, demand, and trade and food prices are
increasingly affected by declining water availability for irrigation. Given significantly
faster growth in water demand in all sectors, developing countries are substantially
more negatively affected by declining water availability for irrigation and other uses
than developed countries. This is especially so for developing countries with arid
climates, poor infrastructure development, and rapidly increasing populations. The
increase in imports of  “virtual water” through the import of water-intensive cere-
als is an important safety valve for many developing countries but does not fully
compensate declining relative water supply for irrigation.  
Rainfed agriculture contributes half the additional cereal production during
1995–2025, showing significant potential for maintaining food security and, impor-
tantly, implying the need to improve rainfed agriculture through rainfall harvest-
ing and other means. Our projections indicate that water productivity of irrigated
crops is also higher than that of rainfed crops in developing countries, but lower in
developed countries. This shows that in developing countries irrigated agriculture
is more efficient than rainfed agriculture in resource utilization and food produc-
tion but also points to the untapped potential to increase the water productivity of
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rainfed crops through research and infrastructure investment. (The potential for
increasing food production from rainfed agriculture is discussed further in Chapters
5 and 8). 
Both the increase of crop yield and the reduction of water consumption
through basin efficiency improvements contribute to increased water productivity,
but the major contribution comes from increased crop yields. Therefore, invest-
ments in agricultural infrastructure and research are an essential complement to
efforts to improve water use efficiency through investments in water management
and infrastructure.   
Worldwide and in large aggregated regions, water withdrawal is a small frac-
tion of total renewable water, but for some countries and river basins (especially
those arid and semi-arid regions) water withdrawal increasingly seems to threaten
the minimum required environmental flow during 1995–2025. The conflict
between irrigation and environmental uses and possible solutions for the resolution
of this conflict is further addressed in Chapters 5 and 7.
Overall, to meet food demand and sustain minimum required environmental
flow to 2025, investments, technology adoption, and policy reform in water and
irrigation management are all necessary to maintain water supply reliability and to
reduce water supply vulnerability for irrigation, especially in developing countries.
More comprehensive analysis through alternative scenarios in terms of investment,
technology, and policy variables follows in subsequent chapters.
NOTES
1.  All results except when noted are based on the mean of 30 hydrologic samples
specified based on the hydrologic regime between 1961 and 1990. The thirty
hydrologic scenarios operate under the same assumptions but with various year
sequences as given below: 
Scenario 1: 1961, 1962... 1990,
Scenario 2: 1962, 1963... 1990, 1961,
Scenario 3: 1963, 1964... 1990, 1961, 1962
...
Scenario 30: 1961, 1962... 1988, 1989, 1990
The projected results are reported as the mean across the 30 scenarios for each
year during 1996–2025.
2. As noted in Chapter 3, estimates for connected households include households
with access to both in-house piped water and to standpipes because compre-
hensive data was unavailable for households with in-house piped connections.
Thus the per capita water consumption differential between connected and
unconnected households, while substantial, is lower than some estimates based
on only in-house piped water connections. 
3. Water productivity is generally defined as physical or economic output per unit
of water application.
4. 1995 is the most recent year for which it was possible to assemble adequate data.
5. WANA as a whole is much more reliant on rainfed cereals, which account for
78 percent of harvested area.
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